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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves the distribution of real property in a divorce matter between
the Plaintiff/Appellant, Gregory Paul Barrett (hereinafter "Greg") and the
DefendantIRespondent,Ann Marie Barrett (hereinafter "Ann"). They were married on
November 1,1997. The divorce trial was held June 18,2007through June 22,2007. A
Rule 54(b)Decree of Divorce was entered on July 3,2007, which divorced the parties,
effective June 22, 2007. R. Vol. I, p. 61-63.
On September 11,2007, the Honorable Judge Earl Blower entered his Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Property and Debt Division and Attorneys Fees. R.
Vol. 11, p. 163-184, along with his Judgment and Order on All Remaining Issues
(property and debt division and attorneys fees). R. Vol. 11, p. 185-190. His decision
declared Greg had a one-half community interest in the Etna real property.
Ann filed her Notice of Appeal on September 14,2007, to the District Court. R.
Vol. 11, p. 191-194. The appeal brought by Ann was in regard to the Magistrate's
September 11, 2007, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and
Order. On August 29,2008, the Honorable Judge Jon J. Shindurling issued his Opinion
and Decision on Appeal. R. Vol. 11, p. 257-266. His decision remanded the case for
further proceedings with instructions that the magistrate should consider parol evidence.
On October 8,2008, Greg filed his Notice of Appeal, R. Vol. 11, p. 274-277, from
the Opinion and Decision on Appeal issued by the Honorable Judge Jon J. Shindurling
on August 29,2008. An Amended Notice of Appeal was filed by Greg on November 14,
APPELIANT'S BRIEF -6

2008, which identified requested exhibits for the appeal. R. Vol. 11, p. 284-288. On
February 11,2009,an Order was issued by Stipulation to supplement the exhibits for
the appeal.
There were numerous Orders entered by the Magistrate after his September 11,

2007, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order, but none of
these Orders are relevant to the pending appeal.
This appeal is from the decision of District Judge Shindurling which directed
Magistrate Judge Earl Blower to consider par01 evidence regarding the characterization
of real property referred to as the "Etna property".
11. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Ann and Greg were married on November 1,1997.Tr. V.1, p. 475, L.8-10.They
were divorced on June 22,2007, on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
The issues presented on this appeal pertain to real property located in Etna,
Wyoming (hereinafter "Etna property"). Tr., V.1, p. 377, L. 20-23. The property is
located just inside the Wyoming border near the town of Afton. Ann purchased the Etna
property with her first husband, Kevin Spencer, during their marriage. Tr., V.1, p. 378,

L. 17-21.
Ann and Kevin Spencer received a deed to the property. Tr., V.1, p. 378, L. 22-

24; Tr., V.1, p. 213, L. 22, and Plaintiff's exhibit 18 (Warranty Deed to Ann and Kevin
Spencer). Ann and Kevin Spencer were divorced on April 24,1996. Tr., V.1, p. 378, L.

25; p. 379, L. 1-6. Plaintiff's exhibit 19 is the Decree of Divorce which was entered
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between Ann and her former husband, Kevin Spencer. Tr., V.1, p. 213, L. 12. In the
Decree of Divorce Ann was awarded the Etna property. Tr., V.1, p. 379, L. 7-10. At the
time of Ann's divorce from Kevin Spencer, the Etna property consisted of approximately
fifteen acres, a marital residence, a mobile home, a hay shed, and a storage shed,
located thereon. Tr., V.1, p. 383, L. 13-16; Plaintiff's exhibit 19; Tr., V.1, p. 382, L. 1522. After the Divorce was entered, Kevin Spencer signed two quitclaim deeds giving Ann
the sole interest in the Etna property. Tr., V.1, p.379, L. 11-14; Plaintiff's exhibit 20; and
Tr., V.1, p. 214, L. 13.The first Quitclaim Deed was signed on March 31,1997, and the
second Quitclaim Deed was signed on April 28, 1998. Plaintiff's exhibit 20. The second
quitclaim deed was signed because the first quitclaim deed contained an incorrect legal
description. Tr., V.1, p. 379, L. 15-20.
During the marriage with Greg, Ann sold part of the Etna property to Eric and
Dawn Loveland in August, 1999. Tr., V.1, p.383, L. 21-25; p. 384, L. 1-3. Ann sold to
the Loveland's two and one-half acres, including her marital residence, for $88,500.00.
Plaintiff's exhibit 22; Tr., V.1, p. 384, L. 10-20. Ann transferred the two and one-half
acres sold to Lovelands through a Warranty Deed signed on August 12,1999, by Ann
and Greg. Tr., V.1, p. 385, L. 5-22; Defendant's exhibit B (WarrantyDeed);andTr., V.1,
p. 385, L. 22.
At the time of Ann's divorce from Kevin Spencer in April, 1996, the Etna property
was valued at $160,000.00 and there was a debt due and owing on the Etna property,
to Countrywide of $126,000.00 resulting in equity awarded to Ann of $34,000.00.
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Plaintiff's exhibit 19 and 21; Tr., V.1, p. 386, L. 2-15. When Ann sold the two and onehalf acres to the Lovelands, Countrywide was owed $122,355.54. Plaintiff's exhibit 22.
The sale price to Lovelands was $88,500.00 so after closing costs and application of the
proceeds from the sale to the Countrywide debt there was still a remaining balance
owing to Countrywide in the amount of $34,512.00. Tr., V.1, p. 386, L. 8-20; Plaintiff's
exhibit 22 (SettlementStatement for the sale of the property to the Lovelands).
In order to pay off the balance of the Countrywide loan during the closing of the
sale to the Lovelands, Ann and Greg obtained a loan through the Bank of Star Valley,
in the amount of $35,881.55. Tr., V.1, p. 386, L 16-20; Plaintiff's exhibit 24 (Promissory
Note for the loan at the Bank of Star Valley). The Countrywide loan was paid in full at
the closing with the loan proceeds received from the Bank of Star Valley. Defendant's
exhibit D (check to Countrywide).
Both Greg and Ann participated in negotiating the terms of the loan with the
Bank of Star Valley which was used to refinance the Countrywide loan on the Etna
property. Ann and Greg met together at the Bank of Star Valley with a cousin of Ann's
named Rod to apply for and establish the terms of the loan. Tr., V.1, p. 226, L. 16 top.
228, L. 7. Ann was not working at the time of the Etna loan application and had no
income other than her child support, rental income from a single wide trailer on the
Etna property and sharing in the community property income of Greg Barrett from his
employment. Tr., V.1, p. 220, L. 1to 2; and Tr., V.1, p. 394, L. 18top. 395, L. 18.The
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Bank of Star Valley required that both Ann and Greg sign on the loan. Tr. V.1, p. 221,
L. 20 to p. 223, L.15; Plaintiff's Exhibit 24.
Ann and Greg met together with the title company closing agent on August 12,
1999, at the Bank of Star Valley to close the sale to Lovelands and the new Bank of Star
Valley loan on the Etna property. Tr., V.1, p. 388, L. 19-20. During the closing the title
agent carefully went over each document separately and explained each document to
Ann and Greg. Tr., V.1, p. 229, L. 8 to p. 230, L. 15; Tr., V.1, p. 390, L. 8 to 11;and
Tr., V.11, p. 628, L. 22 to p. 629, L.3. Greg asked questions on the closing documents if
he did not understand them and the title agent answered all questions asked. Tr., V.1, p.
229, L. 22 to p. 230, L. 4.
Although at trial Ann claimed no memory about signing specific documents at
closing, Tr., V.1, p. 390, L. 4-23, by her presence she participated in the discussion with
Greg and the title closing agent and had each document explained to her by the title
closing agent at the time of closing. Ann had the opportunity to ask any questions about
the documents and what they meant if she did not understand them. Ann heard the
questions by Greg and the answers given by the closing agent at the time of closing. Tr.,
V.1, p. 229, L. 8 to p. 230, L. 15. Ann did not raise any questions or objections at the
time of closing about any of the documents.
During the closing Ann signed a Quitclaim Deed which transferred the Etna
property to Ann and Greg as Tenants by the Entireties, (Plaintiff's exhibit 23), and they
both signed the promissoy note, (Plaintiff's exhibit 24), and the mortgage, (Plaintiff's

exhibit 25), on the Etna property for the new loan with the Bank of Star Valley. Tr., V.1,
p. 230, L. 5 to 8. Ann admitted that she did sign the Etna Quitclaim Deed to her and
Greg at the closing. Exhibit 23. Tr., V.1, p. 390, L. 14 to 17 and Tr., V.1, p. 226, L. 6 to
7.
Ann clearly knew what she was signing when she signed the Quitclaim Deed. Ann
admitted that she knew at the time of the closing on the Bank of Star Valley loan that
the purpose and effect of a Deed was to transfer title and ownership to real property.
Tr., V.11, p. 629, L. 25 top. 630, L. 24; Tr, V.11, p. 635, L. 19 top. 636, L. 9.
Notably Ann had previous experience in real estate transactions in which she
bought, sold and transferred property through a Deed. Ann acquired ownership of the
Etna property in 1989 through a Warranty Deed from the seller to Kevin and Ann
Spencer. Plaintiff's Exhibit 18. Tr., V.11, p. 632, L. 13 to p. 633, L. 4; and Tr., V.1, p.
378, L. 17-24. Ann received a transfer of ownership for the Etna property through the
Decree of Divorce dated April 24, 1996. Tr., V.1, p. 379, L. 3 to 9; Plaintiff's Exhibit 19.
Ann also received a transfer of Kevin Spencer's ownership to her pursuant to two
Quitclaim Deeds dated March 31, 1997, and April 28,1998, the original having an error
in the legal description. Plaintiff's Exhibit20 and Tr., V.1, p. 214, L 1-13. Ann knew and
undersfood the effect of these three Deeds prior to her signing the Quitclaim Deed to her
and Greg on the Etna property on August 12, 1999. Tr., V.1, p. 379, L. 11top. 380, L.

1 and Tr., V.11, p. 633, L. 5-25.
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Ann and Greg jointly signed on August 12, 1999, a Warranty Deed for the
transfer of the two and a half acres of the Etna property to the Lovelands, Defendant's
exhibit B, at the same time Ann signed the Quitclaim Deed to Greg and Ann, Plaintiff's
exhibit 23, at the closing of the new loan from the Bank of Star Valley on the Etna
property. Tr., V.11, p. 630, L. 5-24; Tr., V.1, p. 384, L. 2 -19; and Tr., V.1, p. 216, L. 617. Ann admitted that the Quitclaim Deeds from Kevin Spencer to her at Plaintiff's
exhibit 20 were the same as, and accomplished the same thing as, the Quitclaim Deed
from Ann, to Greg and Ann on the Etna property. Plaintiff's exhibit 23 and Tr., V.11, p.
635, L. 10 to p. 636, L. 9.
Ann raised no objection during the closing of the Etna loan to any documents,
including the Quitclaim Deed. Tr., V.1, p. 230, L. 7-8; p. 232, L. 15-17. Ann made no
objection to the Quitclaim Deed after the closing until after the divorce was filed six
years later. Tr., V.11, p. 637, L. 7-22.
Greg testified at the trial that he understood at the time of closing that the
Quitclaim Deed signed by Ann was a valid transfer of a one-half interest to him in the
Etna property. Tr., V.1, p. 230, L. 16 top. 231, L. 24; and Tr., V.11, p. 719, L. 3 top.
720, L. 9. Greg further understood that he was a cosigner on the Bank of Star Valley
loan and as a result he had a legal responsibility to pay that loan. Tr., V.1, p. 230, L. 16
to p. 231, L. 24. Plaintiff's exhibit 24.
At the time of Greg and Ann's marriage they established a budget and assigned
various bills to each person for payment. Originally they maintained separate bank
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accounts. Each account was commingled with community property funds. Ann's
account received deposits from her child support, the rental income from the rent for her
singlewide mobile home on the Etna property, Tr., V.1, p. 394, L. 18-24 (net rental
income from separate property is community property) and an amount from Greg's
community income which was budgeted for Ann to pay bills, Tr., V.1, p. 395, L. 4-13.
Notably Ann did not maintain a separate property account for payment of the Etna loan
after marriage or after the refinancing in 1999 with the Bank of Star Valley. The
mortgage was paid down to $121,819.00at the time of refinancing on August 12,1999.
In 2006 before Ann and Greg separated, they were approached to sell two acres
to a developer, Wyoming 100, LLC, to provide access to the developer's adjoining
property. The first offer from the developer was for $10,000.00. Greg was primarily
responsible for negotiating a better sale price for the two acres of the Etna property. Ann
was willing to accept the first offer of $10,000.00 (Tr. V.1 p. 242, L. 3 to 6) but Greg
recommended making a higher counteroffer. Such negotiations resulted in the first offer
to purchase going from $10,000.00 to a final agreement of $50,000.00 plus the
development of five lots for Greg and Ann with a potential net profit of $250,000.00.
Tr., V.1, p. 234, L. 21 to p. 250, L. 12; and Plaintiff's Exhibit 28 and 29. The sale
resulted in net cash proceeds of $49,322.19paid to Greg and Ann, which was placed in
Aaron Woolf's trust account during the proceedings by stipulation of the parties.
Plaintiff's exhibit 31; Defendant's exhibit F. In addition the developer is contractually
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obligated to develop five lots for Ann and Greg on the Etna property. Plaintiff's exhibits
27,29 and 30.
Ann and Greg stipulated that the sale to the developer and the deposit of the cash
proceeds into the trust account would not have any effect on the classification of the
Etna property or the sale proceeds as separate or community property. Defendant's
exhibit F.
The Etna property value on the remaining ten and one-half acres appreciated in
value by the time of the divorce of Ann and Greg in July, 2007 to $350,000.00.
Plaintiff's exhibit 32; Tr., Vol. I, p. 335, L. 16-21. However, according to Tom Ogle, a
Wyoming licensed appraiser with a general certified permit to appraise both residential
and commercial type property, who appraised the Etna property for the divorce, most of
that appreciation occurred after 2002 when there was a boom in property values arising
from the pressure from high land prices in nearby Jackson, Wyoming. Tr., V.1, p. 344,

L. 15 to p. 345, L. 6. However, the value of the Etna property at the time of the
refinancing in August, 1999, was probably not significantly more than at the date of
divorce in April, 1996, based on the testimony of Tom Ogle. Therefore, the one-half of
the equity transferred to Greg Barrett by the Quitclaim Deed in August, 1999, would
have been in the range of $17,000.00, ($160,000 fair market value less loan of
$126,000 yields $34,000 equity on date of Ann's divorce), Plaintiff's exhibit 19, or
slightly higher for any appreciation between April, 1996, and August, 1999. As
consideration for Greg receiving one-half of the equity in the Etna property, Greg
APPELLANT'S BRIEF -14

assumed responsibility for the new loan of $35,881.55 and made his separate and
community property now liable as a resource for payment on such loan. Tr., V.1, p. 230,
L. 16 top. 231, L. 24.
Greg participated in ownership and management of the Etna property after title
was transferred to him by Ann's Quitclaim Deed. That involvement included general
upkeep, repair and maintenance of the property fences and buildings, Tr., V.1, p. 382,
L. 4 to 8, applying for and obtaining a permit to increase the highway access from a
narrow farming access on Highway 89 to a wider residential access and installing a new
gate access for the wider residential access, Tr., V.1, p. 415, L. 10 to p. 416, L. 11;Tr.,
V.1, p. 338, L. 13 top.339, L. 11;Tr.,V.1, p.346, L. 10to 15;Tr.,V.I,p.367,L.24to
p. 372, L. 12; and Plaintiff's Exhibits 33 and 34. This new access gate was considered as
adding value to the property by Tom Ogle because it would allow development of
residential lots in the future. Tr., V.1, p. 338, L. 6 to 11.
The Magistrate found that the Quitclaim Deed from Ann to Greg and Ann was
unambiguous and was clear and convincing evidence of a transmutation of Ann's
separate property to community property of Greg and Ann. R. VoI. 11, p. 8. Ann
appealed the Magistrate's decision to the District Court. R. Vol. 11, p. 191. District Judge
Shindurling remanded the case to the Magistrate with directions to consider par01
evidence on intent. From this decision Greg filed his Notice of Appeal. R. Vol. 11, p. 264.
111. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Greg's issues on appeal are as follows:
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1.

Whether the quitclaim deed from Ann to Ann and Greg constituted a valid
conveyance of a one-half community interest in the real property to Greg.

2.

Whether parol evidence regarding intent should have been considered
regarding the validity of the transfer to Greg.

3.

Whether Greg met his burden of proof to show a transmutation of Ann's
separate property to community property.

4.

Whether District Judge Shindurling erred in ruling on appeal that the
Magistrate Judge should consider parol evidence on intent to transmute
property.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When there has been an appeal from the Magistrate Court to the District Court,
on further appeal the Supreme Court bases its review upon the record of the magistrate
proceedings with due regard to the District Court's decision. Ireland v. Ireland, 123
Idaho 955, 957-58,855 P.2d 40,42-43 (1993); Silva v. Silva, 142 Idaho 900, 904,136
P.3d371,375 (Ct. App. 2006). The trial court decision will not be disturbed on appeal if
it appears the decision is based on substantial, albeit conflicting evidence. Huerta v.
Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 896 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1995). The appellate court should
uphold the trial judge's findings of fact if supported by substantial and competent
evidence. Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 848 P.2d 1081; McKoon v. Hathaway, 08.14
ICAR 767,190 P.3d 925 (Ct. App. 2008).
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The trial court's characterization of property as community or separate is a finding
of fact that will not be disturbed on appeal if based on substantial and competent
evidence. Reed v. Reed, 137 ldaho 53, 56, 44 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2002); Worzala v.
Worzala, 134 ldaho 615, 617, 7 P.3d 1092, 1094 (2000); Matter of Estate of Eliasen,
105 Idaho 238, 668 P.2d 110 (1983); Griffinv. Griffin, 102 Idaho 858, 642 P.2d 949
(Ct. App. 1982). The credibility and weight to be given evidence is within the province
of the trial court. The appellate court should liberally construe the trial court's findings of
facts in favor of the judgment. Weilmunster v. Weilmunster, 124 Idaho 227, 232, 858
P.2d 766,771 (Ct. App. 1993). If the issue is one of law, the appellate court exercises
free review of the trial court's decision. Reed, 137 ldaho 53, 56, 44 P.3d 1108, 1111
(2002). Whether terms of a contract are ambiguous is a question of law. If a document
is ambiguous, resolution of the ambiguity is a question of fact. Weilmunster v.
Weilmunster, 124 Idaho 227, 858 P.3d 766 (Ct. App. 1983). If the language of a
document is unambiguous, determination of its meaning and legal effect is a question of
law over which free review is exercised and matters outside the record should not be
used to construe it. McKoon v. Hathaway, 08.14 ICAR 767, 190 P.3d 925 (Ct. App.
2008).

ARGUMENT

1. WHETHER THE QUITCLAIM DEED FROM ANN TO ANN AND GREG
CONSTITUTED A VALID CONVEYANCE OF A ONE-HALF COMMUNITY
INTEREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY TO GREG.
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A. The transfer by quitclaim deed from Ann to Ann and Greg complied
with all statutory requirements for the conveyance of real property.
The requirements for a valid conveyance of real property are noted in I.C. 99-503
and 99-505, which are statutory declarations of the common law rule based on the
statute of frauds.
9-503. Transfers of real property to be in writing. - No estate or
interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not exceeding one
(1)year, nor any trust or power over or concerning it, or in any manner
relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or
declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other
instrument in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized by writing.
9-505. Certain agreements to be in writing - In the following cases
the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or memorandum
thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent.
Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the
writing or secondary evidence of its contents:. ..4. An agreement.. .for the
sale of real property, or of an interest therein ....

A similar requirement is found at I.C. 955-601which provides how a conveyance
of real property is to be made.
55-601. Conveyance - How made. -A conveyance of an estate in real
property may be made by an instrument in writing, subscribed by the
party disposing of the same.. ..
Ann satisfied these requirements by signing a written Quitclaim Deed to
Greg.
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As noted in I.C. 555-604the effect of a written conveyance of real property
is that it is presumed that the Grantor intended to grant a fee simple title unless a
lesser grant is noted in the transfer document.

55-604. Fee presumed to pass. - A fee simple title is presumed to be
intended to pass by a grant of real property unless it appears from the
grant that a lesser estate was intended.
This section creates a presumption that Ann intended to convey a fee simple title
to Greg of a one-half interest in the Etna property.
Further, as noted in I.C. §55-606
the validity of such a grant is declared to be
conclusive against the Grantor, except for a bona fide purchaser or judgment lien holder
who has previously recorded a transfer or lien on the property.

55-606. Conclusiveness of conveyance - Bona fide purchasers. Evey grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is conciusive
against the grantor, also against evey one subsequently claiming under
him, except a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in good faith, and for a
valuable consideration, acquires a title or lien by an instrument or valid
judgment lien that is first duly recorded.
This section makes the transfer conclusive against Ann because there was no
restriction or limitation in the deed. This section operates as more than a presumption
and binds Ann conclusively to the deed which she transferred to Greg.
The recording of a conveyance of real property is constructive notice to
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees.

55-811. Record as notice - Evey conveyance of real property
acknowledged or proved, and certified, and recorded as prescribed by law,
from the time it is filed with the recorder for record, is constructive notice
of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and mortgage(e)es....
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This section provides constructive notice to everyone that Ann transferred a onehalf interest to Greg by signing and recording the Quitclaim Deed.
Other requirements are provided by statute in situations involving property
transfers between husbands and wives. I.C. $32-906 defines community property and
provides that property conveyed by one spouse to the other is presumed to be the sole
and separate property of the receiving spouse.

32-906. Community property - ...Conveyances Between
Spouses .... (1)All other property acquired after marriage by either
Husband or Wife is community property. (2) Property conveyed by one
spouse to the other shall be presumed to be the sole and separate estate of
the grantee and only the grantor spouse need execute and acknowledge
the deed.. ..
The transfer by Quitclaim Deed from Ann to Greg and Ann as tenants by the
entirety created a community property interest in Greg and Ann, as it would be "all
other property acquired after marriage by husband or wife ..." (I.C. $32-906). In
addition, the one-half interest which was conveyed by Ann to Greg is presumed to be
his sole and separate estate.
B. The transfer by quitclaim deed from Ann to Ann and Greg complied with
all requirements for a marriage settlement agreement between spouses.

Additional rules are established by statute regarding property rights between
spouses by marriage settlement agreements. I.C. $32-916 provides that property rights
between a husband and wife are controlled by provisions in that chapter unless there is
an enforceable marriage settlement agreement to the contrary.
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32-916. Property rights governed by chapter. The property rights of
husband and wife are governed by this chapter, unless there is a marriage
settlement agreement entered into during marriage containing stipulations
contrary thereto.
Section 32-906 is within the chapter controlling property rights between husband
and wife and it requires the Etna property to be characterized as community property
and creates a presumption that the one-half interest conveyed to Greg is his separate
estate.
The requirements for a valid marriage settlement agreement are provided at I.C.
$32-917 as follows:

32-917. Formalities required of marriage settlements. All contracts
for marriage settlement agreements must be in writing, and executed and
acknowledged or approved in like manner as conveyances of land are
required to be executed and acknowledged or proved.
In the present case the financial and property transactions between Greg and Ann
satisfied the requirements for a marriage settlement agreement set forth in I.C. $32-917.
The agreement was that Greg would accept responsibility together with Ann, to pay the
promissory note as a community debt, (Plaintiff's exhibit 24), in exchange for a transfer
to him of a one-half interest in the Etna property. (Plaintiff'sexhibit 23). The Promissory
Note, Mortgage and Quitclaim Deed were in writing, and were executed and
acknowledged in the same manner as a conveyance of land, which was noted above in

I.C. $9-503 and 55-601.
A marriage settlement agreement must be recorded in the county recorder's office
where the real estate is located.
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32-918. Marriage settlements - record. (1) When such contract is
acknowledged or proved, it must be recorded in the office of the recorder
of every county in which any real estate may be situated which is granted
or affected by such contract.. ..
(2)(b)A summary of the contract shall be signed and acknowledged by all
parties to the original contract. The summary of the contract shall clearly
state:
(i) The name of the parties to the original contract;
(ii) The complete mailing address of all parties;
(iii) The title and date of the contract;
(iv) A description of the interest or interests in real property created
by the contract; and
(v) The legal description of the property.
In the present case the Quitclaim Deed and Mortgage were properly recorded in
the Lincoln County Recorder's Office by the closing agent on August 13, 1999,
(Plaintiff's exhibits 23 and 25), which gave public notice of the marriage settlement
agreement between Ann and Greg as to the Etna property.
It is important to note the effect of I.C. §32-916, which provides that property
rights of a husband and wife are controlled by that chapter unless there is a marriaqe
settlement asreement contrarv thereto. In this case the transfer from Ann to Greg and
Ann constituted a valid marriage settlement agreement. The only way Ann could claim
that was not the case is if she had a written, signed, acknowledged and recorded
agreement between her and Greg which reversed the transfer to Greg; there was no
such reverse agreement.

C. The transfer by Ann to Ann and Greg constituted a valid and enforceable
conveyance to Greg of a one-half community interest in the Etna property.
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As discussed in greater detail above, a review of these Idaho statutes regarding
transfers of real property, conveyances between spouses, and marriage settlement
agreements, indicates the following conclusions:
1.

Ann satisfied all statutory requirements for the conveyance of real property to

Greg. I.C. §9-503 and 9-505; 55-601.
2.

It is presumed that Ann conveyed a fee simple title to Greg of his one-half

interest. I.C. 355-604.

3.

The transfer by Ann to Greg is conclusive against her and binding on any person

or entity subsequently acquiring an interest in the same property. I.C. 555-606,

4.

The property interest conveyed by Ann during marriage to Greg and Ann is

community property. I.C. $32-906(1).

5.

The transfer by Ann to Greg of a one-half interest in the property is presumed to

convey to him a separate interest in the property. I.C. 532-906(2).
6.

The transfer by Ann to Greg satisfied all the requirements of a marriage

settlement agreement because it was written, signed by Ann, acknowledged by a notary
and recorded in the county where the real property is located. I.C. $32-917,918.
7.

The deed by Ann to Greg and the assumption of liability on the promissory note

constituted a marriage settlement agreement between them in which a one-half interest
in the property was transferred to Greg and he accepted responsibility with Ann for
payment of the loan. I.C. §32-917,32-918.
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8.

There was no other marriage settlement agreement to the contrary which

reversed, limited, or restricted the transfer to Greg. I.C. $32-916 and $32-917.
9.

There must be a counter marriage settlement agreement, or a reverse Quitclaim

Deed signed, acknowledged and recorded by Ann and Greg in order to reverse or void
the transfer to Greg. There is no such agreement. I.C. $32-916.
The conclusion from this review of the controlling statutes for the present case is
that the transfer from Ann to Greg and Ann by Quitclaim Deed constituted a valid and
enforceable transfer to Greg of a one-half interest in the Etna property. Such transfer is
"presumed" to be valid and is "conclusive" against Ann.

2. WHETHER PAROL EVIDENCE REGARDING INTENT MAY BE
CONSIDERED REGARDING THE VALIDITY O F THE DEED TO GREG.
A. Parol evidence should not be considered because the quitclaim deed is
unambiguous.
The parol evidence rule was explained in Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824,828,

11 P.3d 20, 24 (2000) as follows:
The parol evidence rule provides that when a contract has been reduced
to a writing that the parties intend to be a final statement of their
agreement, evidence of any prior or contemporaneous agreements or
understandings which relate to the same subject matter is not admissible to
vary, contradict, or enlarge the terms of the written contract.
The issue and facts in the case of Bliss v. Bliss. 127 Idaho 170, 898 P.2d 1081
(1995) are similar to the present case and applied the parol evidence rule in it's
decision. In that case the husband had signed a deed to his wife on forty-eight acres of
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real property they had jointly purchased with separate funds and the deed was
recorded. At the divorce trial, husband claimed that he had signed the deed in order to
avoid an IRS lien against him on the forty-eight acres. The husband argued the deed
was void for lack of consideration and that he had not intended to actually convey his
interest in the community property to his wife as separate property. The wife gave
conflicting testimony as to the parties' intent regarding the deed. The Idaho Supreme
Court noted that the deed was in writing, signed by the grantor, and included the name
and address of the grantee, so it constituted a valid conveyance of legal title to real
property according to Idaho Code 355-601. Id. at 174. The Court then noted the
presumption from Idaho Code 932-906(2)that "property conveyed to one spouse by
the other shall be presumed to be the sole and separate estate of the grantee". Id.at

In Bliss. the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the husband's statements to show
his intent or that there was no consideration were inadmissible under the parol evidence
rule since the deed was plain and unambiguous. The Court held:
However, Gordon's statements regarding intent and consideration were
inadmissible to contradict the deed's clear language. In Hall v. Hall we
reiterated that where a deed is plain and unambiguous, the intention of
the parties must be determined from the deed itself. "Oral and written
statements are generally inadmissible to contradict or vary unambiguous
terms contained in a deed." Here, not only did Gordon "convey" the
property to Althea, thereby raising the presumption of separateness under
I.C. 932-906(2), the deed expressly states the land is conveyed "as her
separate property." Further, the deed unambiguously declares that it is "in
consideration of ONE DOLLAR and OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION." Gordon's extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to
contradict these clear statements. Thus, the evidence offered to rebut the
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statutory presumption of I.C. $32-906(2)was legally insufficient. (Citations
omitted).Id.at 174-5, 898 P.2d 1081, 1085-1086 (1995).
The Court further explained the policy considerations underlying the par01
evidence rule as well as the statute of frauds.
As we understand the statute [of frauds] above quoted, it was intended to
prevent just such a class of proof and to preclude the possibility of titles
becoming subject to the capricious memories of interested witnesses. The
statute was enacted to guard against the frailties of human memory and
the temptations to litigants and their friendly witnesses to testify to facts
and circumstances which never hannened. Exnerience had convinced
both jurists and lawmakers that the only safe way to preserve and pass title
to real property is by a written conveyance subscribed by the grantor. The
beneficial effects of this statute would be destroyed if a grantor could come
in -years afterwards and submit oral testimonv to show that the convevance
was not intended as an absolute grant but was only intended to create a
trusteeship in the grantee. Id. at 175, 898 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1995).
& .

<

<

The applicable facts in B]iss are identical to the facts in the present case. Ann
conveyed by Quitclaim Deed an interest in her separate real property to herself and
Greg as Tenants by the Entirety'. The deed was in writing, signed by the grantor and
included the name and address of the grantee as required by I.C. 555-601. Plaintiff's
Exhibit 23.
A close review of the Quitclaim Deed reveals a clear and unambiguous statement
of intent to convey a one-half interest in the property to Greg:

l ~ u r i n gthe trial both parties treated the Quitclaim to Ann and Greg as Tenants by the Entireties under Wyominglaw to be the
same as a deed to Ann and Greg, husband and wife, under the community property laws of Idaho. Neither party gave notice
under IRCP Rule 44(d) that a foreign law would apply. Therefore the community property laws of Idaho law have been utilized
throughout this case regarding the effect and rights of the Quitclaim Deed for Ann and Greg. Huerta v. Huerta, 127Idaho 77,
896 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1995).
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QUITCLAIM DEED
KNOWN ALL MEN THESE PRESENTS, That ANN BARRETT FKA
ANN SPENCER, a "Married Person" in consideration of $10.00 and other
good and valuable consideration to them in hand paid by Ann Barrett and
Gregory Barrett, whose address is 775 Tennis Court Drive, Idaho Falls,
Idaho 83406, the receipt whereof is hereby confessed and acknowledged,
have (has) remised, released, convey and forever quitclaimed and by
these presents do for my heirs, executors and administrators, remis, release
and forever quitclaim unto the said ANN BARRETT AND GREGORY
BARRETT, Wife and Husband as Tenants by the Entireties, heirs and
assigns, forever, all such right, title, interest, property, possession, claim
and demand as I have.. .to all the following described premises, to wit:
(legal description)

...TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises unto the said Ann
Barrett and Gregory Barrett... forever so that neither I nor any other
person in my name.. .shall or will hereafter claim or demand any right to
title to the premises.. .but they.. .shall by these presents be excluded and
forever barred. (Plaintiff'sexhibit 23.)
This deed recites that the conveyance was for good and valuable consideration,
so it is not a gift. Hall v. Hall. 116 ldaho 483, 777 P.2d 255 (1989). The deed conveys
all of the rights of Ann as grantor in the property to Ann Barrett and Gregory Barrett as
grantees to all of the property forever. Ann then affirms that she will be excluded and
barred forever from making a claim as grantor to any right to title to the property.
This document succinctly states exactly what this quitclaim deed did -it conveyed
title of the grantor to the grantees as tenants by the entireties. The deed has no
ambiguity in its traditional and careful language, developed over centuries of legal
history and experience, to accomplish real property transfers with established certainty.
The same presumption in I.C. 532-906(2)which was cited in Bliss. applies in the
present case to show that Greg received a separate one-half interest in the property.
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Ann's "extrinsic evidence" is inadmissible to contradict these "clear statements". Ann's
"evidence offered to rebut the statutory presumption of I.C. 332-906(2) was legally
insufficient."
The Idaho Supreme Court's explanation of the policies and considerations
underlying this rule in B@
&
l are also applicable in the present case. The beneficial effects
of the statute of frauds which requires transfers to be in writing would be destroyed if the
grantor, in this case Ann, "could come in years afterwards and submit oral testimony to
show that a conveyance was not intended." Certainty in real estate transactions has
been historically determined to require compliance with the formalities required by
statute in the State of Idaho. Therefore, Ann should not be permitted to violate the
statute of frauds and introduce extrinsic evidence years later in opposition to the
unambiguous deed she signed to Greg.
The case of Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483, 777 P.2d 255 (1985), also provides a
helpful comparison for the present case. In Hall. grandparents had sold property to a
grandson and his wife. The deed was recorded and the required payment of $60,000.00
was made. Later when the grandson and wife were divorcing the grandmother claimed
that the properiy was worth $100,000.00 at the time of the transfer and $40,000.00 was
intended as a gift to the grandson only. The deed said that the property was transferred
"for value received." Based on these facts the Idaho Supreme Court held that par01
evidence of the grandmother's intent was not admissible to contradict the plain
language of the deed.
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Where the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous the intention of
the parties must be determined from the deed itself, and parol evidence is
not admissible to show intent. Oral and written statements are generally
inadmissible to contradict or vary unambiguous terms contained in a deed.
If the language in the deed is ambiguous, then evidence of all surrounding
facts and circumstances is admissible to prove the parties' intent. The parol
evidence rule does not preclude the use of extrinsic evidence to explain
the parties' intent when the provisions of a writing are ambiguous. Where,
as here, the consideration clause clearly recites that the transfer was made
"For Value Received."
. war01 evidence is not admissible to contradict the
deed by attempting to show the transfer was in part a "gift" rather than
"for value." Hall. 116 ldaho 484, 485, 777 P.2d 255, 256 (1985)
A

The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in the Hall case supports the trial judge's
decision in the present case. As in &dl,Ann conveyed title by a clear and
unambiguous Deed to herself and Greg as tenants by the entirety (community property
under Idaho law). Because there was no ambiguity in the deed, the deed controls, and
extrinsic evidence about the parties' intent is not admissible.
Another case which is instructive for the present case is Hoskinson v. Hoskinson,

139 ldaho 448, 80 P.3d 1049 (2003). In the Hoskinson case, the husband obtained
financing which utilized his separate real property as security. At the time of the
financing the wife signed a quitclaim deed to the husband, and the husband signed a
quitclaim deed to himself and his wife as husband and wife. Both deeds were dated
January 23, 1998. The wife's deed to husband was recorded on the same day and
husband's deed to husband and wife was recorded on February 9, 1998.There was a
conflict in the testimony about the purpose and effect of these two conflicting deeds. The
wife claimed she had refused to sign a quitclaim deed to allow the financing to occur
unless the husband signed a deed conveying the property to her and him. The husband
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denied the wife's allegations and claimed that he had signed the quitclaim deed adding
the wife only because the lender gave it to him to sign at closing. He claimed he had no
intention to transmute ownership of his separate property to community property. It is
important to note that & the husband signed the promissory note on his new loan
and the wife did not become personally obligated on the new loan. The trial judge
found there was an ambiguity from the two inconsistent deeds and that it was unclear
which deed had been signed first, and therefore, considered parol evidence on the
intent of the parties. The trial judge noted that the wife had not been truthful in her
testimony on other matters. Based thereon the trial judge concluded that the wife had
not met her burden of proof to show a transmutation or gift of the separate property
interest of the husband in his real property to a community property interest for
husband and wife. The Idaho Supreme Court noted "the burden of proof on the party
asserting transmutation is a high one.. .by clear and convincing evidence," citing
v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 222, 657 P.2d 1083, 1090 (Ct. App. 1983). The Idaho

Supreme Court held there was sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's findings
that a transmutation of husband's separate property to community property did not
occur.
In the Hoskinson case there are important factual differences to consider when
comparing it to the present case. First, Greg signed the promissory note and mortgage at
the time of the refinancing and became personally obligated on the new loan thereby
giving consideration for the transfer to him of an interest in the property. Plaintiff's
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exhibits 24 and 25.This obligated his community property and his separate property as
a source for repayment. In the Hoskinson case a transfer from the husband to the wife
would have been a gift because the wife did not assume any personal liability and
therefore no consideration was given for the change to a community property interest.
Second, in the present case there was no quitclaim deed back to Ann from Greg
to create an ambiguity. In the Hoskinson case the two conflicting deeds created an
ambiguity which allowed par01 evidence to be considered on the intention of the parties.
Third, it is important to note that the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the decision of
the trial judge as the finder of fact based on substantial competent evidence which was
not clearly erroneous. Hoskinson at 1061. The Court did not rule whether as a matter of
law the transfer from husband to wife or wife to husband in Hoskinson was or was not a
valid transfer. The Court merely upheld the trial judge's findings and conclusions as
being sufficiently supported by substantial competent evidence. In the present case the
trial judge found no ambiguity and such finding should be upheld on appeal as based
on substantial competent evidence.
Fourth, in the present case there was not a question about Greg testifying
honestly and correctly as existed in the Hoskinson case. In Hoskinson, the trial judge
adopted husband's testimony because wife had not been truthful in other matters. In
fact, there was really no conflict between the testimony by both Greg and Ann about the
circumstances relating to the signing of the new loan documents and the quitclaim deed.
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Interestingly,Judge Blower was the trial judge in both the Hoskinson case and the
present Barrett case, and presumably knew well the facts and the ruling in Hoskinson,as
he rendered his decision on the facts in the present case.
The case of Griffin v. Griffin, 102 ldaho 858, 642 P.2d 949 (Ct. App. 982) is
instructive on when a refinance of separate property during marriage will not result in a
transmutation. In that case husband refinanced his separate property during marriage.
Both husband and wife signed the promissory note and the Deed of Trust for the new
loan. However, the husband did not sign a deed to wife to place her on the title as part
of the refinancing. Based on those facts the Court of Appeals held there was no

transmutation, noting that since there was no deed to the wife, there could be no
transmutation. In the present case there is a clear and unambiguous deed from Ann to
Ann and Greg, so the opposite conclusion from Griffin should be reached that there was
a transmutation during refinancing.
These cases support the trial judge's decision in the present case that a clear and
unambiguous deed between spouses mandates the exclusion of parol evidence and
constitutes clear and convincing evidence of a transmutation between spouses.

3. WHETHER GREG MET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW A
TRANSMUTATION,OF ANN'S SEPARATE PROPERTY TO COMMUNITY
PROPERTY.

A. Greg met his burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence to show a
transmutation occurred.
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Greg claims there was a transmutation of Ann's separate property to community
property in the Etna property as a result of her quitclaim deed to Ann and Greg.
Transmutation has been defined as follows:
Transmutation is a broad term used to describe arrangements between
spouses which change the character of property from separate to
community and vice versa. W.Reppv and W. DeFuniak. Communitv
Pronerty in the United States, page 421 (1975); Grifln v. Griffin, 102
Idaho 858, 861, 642 P.2d 949, 952 (1976).
The burden of proof to show a transmutation was defined in Ustick v. Ustick, 104
Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1985), as follows:

...the burden is on the party urging the assertion to prove the intent in
question by clear and convincing evidence.. ..concomitantly, because the
question of whether a "clear and convincing" burden of proof has been
met is a question for the trier of facts to decide in the first instance, the
determination of the trial judge - that a claim was not shown by clear and
convincing evidence is entitled to great weight on appeal. (Citations
omitted.) Id at 222, 657 P. 2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1985).
A determination of whether Greg met this burden of proof requires the analysis of
several factors and the application of presumptions and statutory rules and case law.
First, the Court should consider whether the decision of the trier of fact was based
on substantial and competent evidence to support its conclusion that the evidence was
clear and convincing. This analysis requires consideration of whether the transaction
satisfied all statutory requirements for the transfer of an interest in real property. As
noted previously at pages 17 to 20, all statutory requirements were met. The loan
closing documents were prepared by a title company in the form and with the terms
required by the bank issuing the loan. They were accepted, signed by both parties and
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acknowledged in the normal course of a closing. The documents were properly recorded
in the county recorder's office. The bank gave the requested loan to Ann and Greg in
reliance on the signed documents. There was no ambiguity in the documents, including
the quitclaim deed.
Ann accepted the benefit of the bank loan. Greg accepted the new detriment to
be personally liable for that loan and in exchange received a one-half interest in the
Etna property. Everything was done properly and correctly to satisfy the bank and the
closing agent and the parties. These facts must be considered clear and convincing, or
else no real property transaction will ever have reliability. To find otherwise means that
every ordinary and customary real estate transaction handled with proper documents
and with a proper closing is somehow not "clear" or not "convincing" and would be
subject to challenge. This compliance with Idaho statutes for the transfer of real property
further verifies that there was clear and convincing evidence of the transmutation of the
Etna property.
In addition, this transaction satisfied all statutory requirements for a marriage
settlement agreement. As noted previously at pages 20 to 22 this transaction also
complied with all requirements for a husband and wife to enter into a marriage
settlement agreement to change the ownership of property rights between them. The
quitclaim deed conveyed a joint interest to Greg and Ann as tenants by the entirety (as
community property under Idaho law), and the promissory note obligated Greg,
together with Ann, on the new bank loan. All statutory requirements for a marriage
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settlement agreement were satisfied with a writing, signed by the parties and
acknowledged before a notay and recorded, with a correct legal description. (I.C.$32917 and 332-918.) This compliance with Idaho statutes for a marriage settlement
agreement further verifies that there was clear and convincing evidence of the
transmutation of the Etna property.

B. Ann failed to meet her burden of persuasion to counter the evidence of the
validity of the Quitclaim Deed.

Once Greg has met his burden of proof on transmutation, then the burden of
persuasion shifted to Ann to show sufficient evidence to the contrary. Bliss v. Bliss, 127
Idaho 170, 898 P.2d 1081 (1995). According to Rule 301 of the Idaho Rules of
Evidence this burden also shifts in response to various presumptions that apply to the
facts of the case, including:

1.

Property acquired during marriage is presumed to be community property.
(I.C. §32-906(1)).The Etna property was "acquired by Ann and Greg as
Tenants by the Entirety during marriage (as community property under Idaho
law).

2.

The burden of persuasion is on the person claiming separate property to
prove by a reasonable certainty. Stanser v. Stanqer, 98 Idaho 725,571 P.2d
1126 (1977); Reed v. Reed. 137 Idaho 53,44 P.3d 1108 (2002); Worzala v.

Worzala, 128Idaho 408, 913 P.2d 1178 (2000).

3.

If a deed complies with the requirements in I.C. §55-601, then I.C. $32906(2) creates a presumption that the property conveyed is the separate
property of the grantor. Bliss v. Bliss. 127 ldaho 170,898 P.2d 1081 (1995).

4.

Fee simple title is presumed to pass by a grant of real property unless it
appears on the deed that a lesser grant was intended. (I.C. §55-604.)

5.

A grant of real property is conclusive against the grantor. (I.C. §55-606.)
Whether Ann has met this burden of persuasion requires an analysis similar to

that done for Greg's burden of proof. The following demonstrates that Ann did not meet
her burden of persuation.

1.There is no oral transmutation allowed in Idaho. Griffin v. Griffin,102 Idaho
858,642 P.2d 949 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982); Stockdale v. Stockdale. 102ldaho 870,643
P.2d 82. Therefore, Ann cannot claim there was a reversal of the transfer to Greg by
some oral agreement, or that the parties had an oral agreement that they did not really
intend the transfer to be effective.
2. Ann claims that she did not understand the quitclaim deed. Ann's failure to
understand the quitclaim deed she approved and signed is not a valid defense. A similar
argument was made in the case of Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz. 144 ldaho
304, 160 P.3d 743 (2007), but rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. In that case the
agent for the Plaintiff Church could not read English and thought he was signing a
purchase contract for real property. In fact the contract, which was written in English,
was only a lease with an option to purchase. The option date passed since the Plaintiff
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Church was not aware of the option. The Court held that the agent's failure to read or
understand the contract when signing it was not an excuse and the Plaintiff Church was
bound by the contract it signed. That is another way of stating the legal maxim that
"ignorance of the law is not a defense." See Tr. V. 11, p. 636, L. 20 to 24.
3. Ann's claim that she did not intend to transfer an interest in the property to
Greg when she signed the quitclaim deed should not even be considered based on the
par01 evidence rule. (Bliss v. Bliss, 1 2 7 Idaho 170, 898 P.2d 1081 (1995). Deed to
spouse was unambiguous so Husband denied right to give evidence of his intent only to
avoid IRS lien.) (Hall v. Hall, 116Idaho 483, 777 P.2d 255 (1989) Grandma's deed to
son and daughter-in-law stated "for value" so it was unambiguous and testimony of
intent for gift not allowed.) See also Argument, pages 24 to 32 herein.

4. Even if considered, Ann's oral testimony on intent bears minimal weight as
evidence. This type of testimony in which a grantor has a self serving interest and orally
claims a different intent to alter or vary what is written in a document, has been called
the weakest kind of evidence. Claunch v. Whvte, 73 Idaho 243, 249 P.2d 915 (1952);
Hall v . Hall. 116 Idaho 483, 777 P.2d 255 (1989), Justice Bistline's concurring opinion
atp. 259. When Ann's oral testimony about her subjective intent is disallowed, there is
no evidence in the record to support Ann's burden of persuasion. If it were allowed such

a self-serving oral statement should not prevail over all of the written documentation
proving to the contrary.
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5. Ann cannot argue that the deed was never delivered to Greg and therefore it
was invalid. In the recent case of Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 179 P.3d 303
(2008), the husband signed a Quitclaim Deed to his wife on community property they
owned in Idaho. He claimed the purpose of the quitclaim deed was to avoid probate
due to his hazardous occupation so that the deed could transfer ownership to his wife at
the time of his death. He claimed there was no intent to "deliver" the deed at that time
and make it presently effective rather than at his death. The Affidavit of the husband
further stated that the husband and wife had previously prepared a similar deed from
husband to wife on other property they had owned in California, which was also done
with the intent to be effective at his death to avoid probate. After the deed to wife was
signed on the California property the parties sold the California property and used the
proceeds to buy the Idaho community property. The case was originally decided at the
trial court level on a Motion for Summay Judgment. The magistrate had refused to
consider an Affidavit of husband reciting these facts which he submitted on his Motion
to Reconsider the Summary Judgment. The reason given by the magistrate was that the
Affidavit had been filed late and would not be considered on a Motion for
Reconsideration. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the magistrate erred in not
considering the Affidavit on the Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to IRCP
11(a)(2)(B). The Court explained that delivey of the deed is necessa y for the deed to
be valid and therefore the factual issue was properly raised by the husband's Affidavit
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on the Motion for Summary Judgment. As a result the summary judgment was incorrect
and the case was remanded for further consideration by the trial court.
In Barmore v. Perrone, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the husband's
claim that he did not "deliver" or "intend to deliver" the deed when signed was a factual
issue that had to be determined from evidence outside of the document so par01
evidence was admissible on that issue. Ann never raised this issue in the five day trial
about whether the Quitclaim Deed was "delivered" to Greg. Ann only testified that she
did not "intend" to give Greg a one-half interest in the Etna property. As previously
noted, Greg provided consideration by accepting responsibility for the debt owing on
the property so it was clearly not a gift.
In the present case Ann's Quitclaim Deed to Greg was recorded in the county
recorder's office. Plaintiff's exhibit 23. The recording of a deed creates a presumption of
delivery. Hartelv v. Stibor, 96 Idaho 157, 525 P.2d 352 (1974); Hiddleson u. Cahoon,
3 7 ldaho 142,214 P. 1042 (1923); Idaho Trust Co.. u. Eastman, 4 3 ldaho 142,294 P.

890 (1926). In Hartlev, the Idaho Supreme Court also applied the presumptions in I.C.

$55-604that a fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass in a deed, and in I.C.
§55-604 that a deed of conveyance is conclusive against the grantor. The Court then
reversed the trial court which had found the grantor did not intend a delivery of the
deed, even though it was recorded and in the possession of the grantee.
In the present case, the title company returned the recorded Quitclaim Deed to
Ann and Greg and it was in their possession as indicated by the recording certification
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on the deed introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit 23. Possession of a deed by the grantee
also creates a presumption of delivery. Hartlev v. Stibor, supra. Since both recording
and possession of the deed occurred, delivery of the deed should be undisputed.
Ann did not claim at trial that there was no "delivery" of the deed. She did claim
that she did not "intend" to give Greg a one-half interest in the property. Her claim was
based on her alleged misunderstanding of the effect of the deed. This is the same
argument made in Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, supra., which was denied as

a ground to avoid a contract. Ann's claim is that she did not intend to transfer what the
deed said. It was not that she did not intend to "deliver" the deed to Greg. Therefore,
the argument from Barmore supra, does not apply in this case.

6. The Bank of Star Valley required a valid and effective deed in the name of
Ann and Greg to be recorded in order for a loan to be granted. Ann accepted the
benefit of that loan. Greg accepted the detriment or duty to pay the loan, in reliance on
a valid deed conveying a one-half interest in the property to him. The world and
creditors were on notice that Ann had conveyed a valid one-half interest to Greg in the
Etna property. It would be incongruous and inconceivable for Ann to now claim that she
really did not "deliver" the deed to Greg, when everyone but her must rely on the deed
being validly delivered. Ann should be estopped from claiming non-delivery of the deed
based on her acceptance of the benefits and the detriment to Greg from signing the new
loan. Mohr v. Schultz, 86 Idaho 531,388 P.2d 1002 (1964); Vanoski v. Thomson, 114
ldaho 381, 757 P.2d 244 (1988).
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4. WHETHER DISTRICT JUDGE SHINDURLING ERRED IN RULING ON

APPEAL THAT THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE SHOULD CONSIDER PAROL
EVIDENCE ON INTENT TO TRANSMUTE PROPERTY.
Magistrate Judge Blower made specific findings that there was no ambiguity in
the quitclaim deed between the parties and therefore parol evidence was not admissible.
He further found that there was clear and convincing evidence that a transmutation of
the property occurred based on that evidence. R. Vol. 11, p. 169-170.
On appeal District Judge Schindurling failed to apply a proper standard of review
even though his opinion at R. Vol. 11, p. 259-260 recited a correct standard of review.
The appellate court failed to comply with that standard by not accepting the
findings of the magistrate judge when there was substantial and competent evidence in
support thereof. The appellate court failed to accept the trial court's analysis of the
weight given evidence unless it is clearly erroneous. The appellate court failed to
acknowledge the sound discretion of the trial court in determining the characterization of
propetty absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. The appellate court failed to
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. R. Vol. 11, p. 259260.
The primary error of the appellate court is in its application of the parol evidence
rule. First, the court should review the deed, second, determine if there is an ambiguity,
and third consider parol evidence only if there is an ambiguity. The appellate court has
reversed step two and three by looking outside the deed to parol evidence about the
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surrounding circumstances and then finding that if there is an ambiguity in the outside
circumstances, then parol evidence should be considered. R. Vol. 11, p. 264. The trial
court correctly followed the proper steps by reviewing the deed, determining there was
no ambiguity in the deed, and therefore refusing to consider parol evidence of outside
circumstances. R. Vol. 11, p. 169-170.
The appellate court tries to distinguish the Hoskinson case from the present case
but does so inappropriately. The appellate decision notes "The Hoskinson case did not
involve ambiguity in the document itself; the ambiguity arose from the circumstances
surrounding the separate quitclaim deeds, including the existence of two deeds." R. Vol.

11, p. 262. That is not correct. In the Hoskinson case the ambiguity was the two deeds
which purportedly made opposing transfers, signed on the same day and both recorded.
The court could not determine which deed was signed first. Therefore, the two deeds
were the ambiguity. Since the documents involved were ambiguous the court in
Hoskinson went to step three to use parol evidence to resolve the ambiguity. In the
present case there was only one deed and it was unambiguous. Therefore, the third step
of using parol evidence should not be considered.
The appellate court also misstates the ruling in Griffinv. Griffin,102 Idaho 858,
642 P.2d 949 (Ct. App. 1982).The appellate court first states that the parties in Griffin
"had signed a loan agreement stating that the title to the property would vest in both
parties." R. Vol. 11, p. 262. In fact the parties only signed a loan annlication, preliminary
to obtaining the loan, in which they wrote on the application that the title would be
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"joint". Griffin v. Griffin, 102Idaho 858,861, 642 P.2d 949, 952 (Ct. App. 1982). The
appellate court then states that "the finding in Griffin is not based on the existence or
non existence of a deed, but rather in the lack of clear and convincing evidence that a
transmutation took place." R. Vol. 11, p. 263. This statement misses the point. There
cannot be a transfer and there cannot be a transmutation unless there is a transfer
document. Griffin declared there is no oral transmutation in Idaho. There was no deed
conveyed from husband to wife in Griffin,supra. Therefore, there was no transmutation
and obviously no clear and convincing evidence. The controlling fact was that there was
no deed from the husband to wife. The corollary rule of the Griffin case is that if there is
a clear and unambiguous deed from husband to wife then that could be the clear and
convincing evidence to justify a transmutation.
B
The appellate court next attempts to distinguish the &
case on the basis that

case from the present

was a transmutation of husband's community property

interest to the wife as her separate property. In the present case the transfer is from
Ann's separate property to Ann and Greg as community property. This is a distinction
without any significance. I.C. 332-906(2),which was applied in theBAcase and in the
present case creates a presumption that if one spouse conveys property to the other
spouse, then the grantee spouse receives it as a separate estate. The code section does
not say "separate property". When Greg received a one-half interest in the Etna
property as community property, he received a "separate estate" in that one-half interest
and the presumption applies. The appellate court says the presumption of I.C. 932-

906(2) is "wildly different" from the &k
However, in&B

standard of clear and convincing evidence.

the quitclaim deed from husband to wife was the only sisnificant fact

which the trial judge used to determine that there was clear and convincing evidence of
transmutation under the Ustick standard. This analysis was upheld by the Idaho
Supreme Court. The appellate court further tries to distinguish

because it did not

involve refinancing but cites no authority for that position.
The appellate court tries to distinguish Hall u. Hall, 116 ldaho 483,777 P.2d 255

(1985) but again misses the point. The appellate court cites the facts in H d as "the
parties had received a home and the deed had been unambiguous. The husband's
grandparents had given the parties a home, accompanied by a deed that read 'for value
received."' R. Vol. 11, p. 263. The important factor in the

case was that Halls had

purchased the home from the grandparents for $60,000.00. The deed in fact recited
"for value received." Since the deed was unambiguous, the grandmother's oral claim of
a gift could not be considered due to the parol evidence rule. Thus, in &$ the
grandmother's attempt to alter the terms of the unambiguous deed was denied because
parol evidence was not allowed. Similarly in the present case, Ann's attempt to alter the
terms of an unambiguous deed through parol evidence should not be allowed.
The appellate court rejects Ann's request to interpret the law to allow parol
evidence on a conveyance of property between spouses in any refinancing situation.
The appellate court states it could not "find in the case law any hint of a mandate
requiring courts to always consider parol evidence". R. Vol. 11, p. 264. Nevertheless the
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appellate court then applies that very rule where there was no "hint of a mandate", by
stating that courts are "granted much broader leeway in considering parol evidence in
situations where an otherwise unambiguous document is part of a refinancing situation."

R. Vol. 11, p. 264. No authority is cited for such a statement. Furthermore, counsel for
Appellant Barrett has found no such authority.
The appellate court's analysis then reverses steps two and three as noted above.
The appellate court notes that Ann gave parol evidence that she did not intend to
transmute the property. The appellate court then says the magistrate court should have
considered parol evidence before determining if there was clear and convincing
evidence of transmutation. The correct order of the parol evidence rule states differently,
that the court can only consider parol evidence if the deed is ambiguous on its face.
The appellate decision seems to say that if the circumstances of a transaction
appear to be ambiguous then the parol evidence rule does not apply, but such a rule is
exactly opposite of the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule only applies when
the deed is ambiguous, and not just because factors outside of the record show an
ambiguity. Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 828, 11 P.3d 20, 24 (2000).
Based on this analysis of Judge Schindurling's appellate decision, this Court
should reverse Judge Schindurling's decision and reinstate the magistrate judge's
decision.
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CONCLUSION
Greg requests that this Court uphold the decision of the trial judge, made after a
five day trial with full opportunity to consider the witnesses' testimony. This Court
should uphold the trial court's decision that the Quitclaim Deed from Ann to Ann and
Greg was unambiguous, so parol evidence should not be considered to vary the terms
of the Deed. Secondly, this Court should uphold the trial court's decision that Greg met

his burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence through compliance with all
statutory requirements for the transfer of property, all requirements for a marriage
settlement agreement between spouses and compliance with rules established by Idaho
case law. The Court should further uphold the trial court's decision that Ann did not
meet her burden of persuasion to counter that evidence.
Respectfully submitted this
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day of April, 2009.
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